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Introduction
Since the late 1970s the apartheid state has faced a sustained
and deepening crisis of legitimation.(1) This crisis has been
exacerbated by the attempt, and failure, to implement the post-
Soweto 'Total Strategy' reforms - reforms which, in the case of
the black people of South Africa, left the territorial and
political basis of grand apartheid intact. Since the end of the
short-lived boom of 1979-82, the crisis of political legitimacy
has been amplified by the slide into economic depression, and the
scope for concessionary economic reforms has been drastically
curtailed.
For some time, the state has been caught up with the
immediate threat of escalating opposition in the townships, the
symptoms of the deepening economic crisis and spreading
international hostility to apartheid. But while this has been
happening, elements within the ruling groups, both inside and
outside the state, have for some time been attempting to map out
a longer-term strategic offensive aimed at defusing political
conflict and re-structuring the economy. Faced with a shrinking
material basis for concessionary economic reform and growing
mobilisation behind the demand for the extension of political
rights, the country's ruling groups have begun the search for
political solutions to the crisis.
The schemes now being formulated take as their starting point
the ultimate inevitability of political incorporation of black
people into a single national state in South Africa. They aim to
meet this in ways that ensure that real power remains in the
hands of the ruling classes.
The move towards political reforms for black people has gone
beyond the stage of discussion and planning in certain areas of
policy. Already an important pillar of the emerging strategy has
gained expression in local government measures passed in 1985.
(2) However much of what is planned has so far only appeared in
general policy statements. It is also evident that important
facets of the strategy are still in the stage of formulation or
are deliberately being held back for the moment. The fluidity of
political conditions in South Africa is such that state strategy
is the subject matter of open debate and contestation, and is
unusually susceptible to official reconsideration and
reformulation. Nevertheless we believe it is possible to identify
the major contours of an emerging strategy which has been pursued
with increasing determination by reformers within the commanding
heights of the state since late in 1984.
This offensive is significant in that it goes well beyond the
policy package associated with the Wiehahn and Riekert Commission
reports, the Koornhof Bills, the new constitution, and the
confederation of ethnic states - it goes beyond the 'Total
Strategy' formulated by PW Botha in the late 1970s. (3) In
contrast to these policies, it is based on an abandonment of the
political and territorial premises of apartheid, though not
necessarily of race or ethnicity, and envisages the eventual re-
incorporation of the bantustans into a single national South
African state.
The manner in which this will occur is by no means clear or
decided. However, this process of political re-integration of the
bantustans is intended ultimately to result in the re-
organisation of the territorial basis of South Africa's economic
and political system. Central to the reform strategy is the
conception that the present provinces and bantustans will be
superceded by metropolitan and regionally-based administrative
structures through a process of merging, absorption and cross-
cutting of present geographical boundaries. It is this geographic
outcome of the intended reform strategy that has led us to
describe the complex of evolving measures as the state's regional
strategy.
The aim of this article is to describe, anticipate and
critically analyse the outlines of the emerging regional
strategy. Its three major components are new controls on labour
movement and settlement, regional development policies (notably
industrial decentralisation), and local and second tier
government reforms and corresponding constitutional changes. We
examine each of these three components and their
interconnections.
These changes are a ruling class response to escalating
township struggles, the determined resistence of squatter
communities to removal, the dogged efforts of unions to unite
migrants and locals and mass rejection of the new constitution.
They have also been shaped by the operation of glacial forces,
which have produced a concentration of industry and population in
and around South Africa's metropolitan industrial and commercial
centres. The development of metropolitan-centred and wider
regional sub-economies over a decade and more, we argue, has
eroded the primary division between the 'white' and bantustan
areas on which apartheid was constructed; and has eroded the
dualistic spatial framework on which South Africa's political
economy was based.
A central issue taken up in the paper is the debate over the
possible construction of a federal system in South Africa. We
examine major alternative conceptions of the basis of federalism
- geographic and ethnic - and show how they correspond to or
contradict other plans to divide South Africa into metropolitan
and wider planning and administrative regions.
The paper ends with an assessment and critical analysis of
the regional strategy.
Industrial decentralisation and influx control policies
Labour movement and settlement controls
The basic aim of the urbanisation strategy set out by the Riekert
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Commission report in 1979 was to resolve the cownship crisis by
giving recognition to the permanence of urban Africans and to
secure their ecoomic welfare by strengthening barriers against
competition for urban jobs from the relatively impoverished rural
workforce.
The Commission drew a sharp distinction between insiders
'settled urban Africans' with residence rights under Section 10
of the Urban Areas Act - and outsiders - Africans domiciled in
the the bantustans with temporary employment contracts in the
white cities- While insiders were to be allowed to move freely
within the urban areas subject to the availability of housing and
employment, far stricter controls were to be applied to outsiders
wishing to enter these areas. The new system of influx control
was to be exercised by fortified labour bureaux called assembly
centres. (A)
What distinguished this policy from traditional apartheid
was official acknowledgement of the right of (a narrowly defined)
group of African city residents to remain in white South Africa.
This group was to be allowed to move freely between prescribed
urban areas subject to the availability of approved jobs and
housing. These rights were not, however, to be extended to the
political realm. Urban Africans would only be allowed to exercise
national political rights within their designated bantustans.
Thus the recommendations set out in the Riekert report were
framed within the basic political and geographical premises of
traditional apartheid; that the majority of Africans could be
contained within the bantustans and that even those who resided
in white South Africa could be treated as citizens of
independent, or potentially independent, black states.
In the six years since the publication of the Riekert
Commission report and acceptance of its recommendations by the
government there have been repeated attempts to implement this
policy through drafting new legislation and re-organisation of
administrative machinery of labour control. All attempts thus far
have failed to give effect to the basic Riekert strategy of
dividing the African population into insiders and outsiders and
implementing the legislation necessary to maintain this division.
(5)
The breakdown of the Riekert approach was due to struggles
waged against it by squatters resisting removal; by international
pressure groups; and also by big capitalists (for example through
the propaganda exercises of the Urban Foundation), The
organisational efforts of the union movement, which served to
unite long-distance migrants, commuters and urban dwellers,
contributed to the erosion of 'insider/outsider' divisions rooted
in the 'white' South Africa/bantustan divide.
Traditional labour movement controls in South Africa were
designed to regulate the flow of African workers from rural to
urban, and from bantustan to 'white', areas. However, the de
facto incorporation of parts of bantustans into suburban
peripheries of various metropolitan areas such as Durban and
Pretoria over the last 10-15 years, and rapid and relatively
unrestrained migration within bantustans from the rural areas to
these metropolitan peripheries within bantustans is an important
structural factor underlying recent policy changes.
The crucial consequence of these structural changes is the
massive increase in the size of the cross-border commuter labour
force and the relative decline in long-distance labour migration.
(6) Despite their formal legal status, commuter populations have
become effectively indistinguishable from urban insiders, even
though they are located on the peripheries of the metropoles.
Recent legislation has recognised this by allowing commuters to
retain Section 10 rights. What these processes amount to is the
occupational and residential stabilisation of the African working
class in and around the metropolitan areas - the formation of
what we call new regional proletariats in South Africa.
The recognition of regional labour markets and the
possibility of creating regional labour markets was considered in
the The White Paper on the Creation of Employment Opportunities
(1984). It approved of the policy, which
...pays particular attention to the need for creating more
employment opportunities and places greater emphasis on
dealing with labour matters In a^  regional context. (7)
Similarly the Department of Constitutional Development and
Planning has expressed the view that labour supply areas should
be identified with specific regions. (8) This clearly cuts right
across the Riekert conception of rights of labour mobility being
restricted to urban insiders within 'white' South Africa.
The distance of Port Elizabeth, the East Rand and, most
importantly, Cape Town from bantustans, has rendered cross-border
commuting non-viable in these areas (the Bronkhorstspruit
township called Ekangala which is sited in KwaNdebele is altering
this situation in the case of the East Rand). Even in these cases
the state has proved incapable of preventing the permanent
urbanisation of people who previously would have been prevented
from entering these areas except as long distance migrants. State
attacks on squatters in these areas have given rise to explosive
situations - in particular at Crossroads. The resultant
struggles received considerable international coverage and forced
the state to accept the permanence of large informally settled
African populations in Soweto-by-the-Sea and Crossroads; to build
new townships in 'white' South Africa (as at Khayelitsha); and to
grant leasehold rights to established Western Cape African
townships such as Nyanga and Gugulethu. This shift of policy is
expressed in the recent scrapping of the 'coloured labour
preference' policy in the Western Cape, which reserved jobs in
this area for coloured workers.
Organised industry's recently intensified campaign against
influx control involves, in part, a concern to defuse the types
of conflicts that have beset Crossroads. Capital also recognises
that, in one form or another, 'urbanisation' is taking place in
spite of influx control,(9) and this makes political costs of
influx control appear even higher. Nor are the costs to capital
only political: at a time of recession and inflation the
administrative costs of influx control, the rigidities that it
introduces into the labour market, and its impact on urban wages
have appeared far too great.
No doubt some businessmen hope that the exposure of
organised labour to competition from a regional surplus
population will put pressure on urban wage rates and thus erode
the gains made by the independent trade union movement in the
years immediately following the Riekert report. Certainly capital
has called for greater play of market forces, involving a wider,
more flexible definition of 'urban* and 'urbanisation' policy in
an effort to counter this trend. (10)
The fundamental flaw of the urbanisation strategy set out by
the Riekert Commission of 1979 was that it failed to address the
twin issues of the urbanisation of the bantustans and African
rural impoverishment inside and outside the bantustans • The
success of its strategy of strengthening influx controls and
segregating urban African 'insiders' from 'outsiders' in the
bantustans, hinged above all on securing the economic viability
and independence of the bantustans as well as the legitimacy of
their political systems. In fact the six years since the Riekert
report appeared have witnessed a mounting crisis of bantustan
legitimacy. This has occurred through the exposure of desperate
rural poverty, a flight from the countryside to the urban areas
of the bantustans and into the peripheries of the white-
controlled cities, increased reliance of Africans resident in the
bantustans on incomes earned in the white-controlled economy
through migration and commuting, and heavy dependence of the
bantustan states on the South African treasury.
The failure of the Riekert strategy has led both the state
and capital to reconsider and reformulate urbanisation strategy
within a framework which rejects the premises and objectives of
traditional apartheid, and to replace it with a concept of
'planned urbanisation'. In essence the emerging policy of planned
urbanisation involves a widening of the official definition of
'settled urban' Africans to embrace sections of the de facto
urban African population in and around the metropolitan areas.
This new definition of the metropolitan areas is expressed in the
recent Regional Services Council (RSC) Act. This Act provides for
the inclusion of African townships within bantustan areas
abutting metropolitan areas into the administrative ambit of
these new local government structures.
This last provision is a decisive break with the notion of
the bantustans constituting independent economic and political
units which underpinned the Riekert strategy. The new definition
of a metropolitan area includes urban and (potentially) quasi-
urban settlements within parts of the bantustans - those within
commuting distance of the industrial and commercial centres of
the country. These areas are now being seen as falling within the
sphere of the Regional Services Councils.
In another move which corresponds to the shift in policy,
some metropolitan administration boards have, for over two years,
given 'administrative' Section 10 rights to workers resident in
commuter areas, if they previously held such rights in the
prescribed urban area concerned. More recently legislation has
been passed which enables Africans to retain Section 10 rights
after they have been moved from a prescribed area into a
bantustan.(11) In this way the meaning of 'local' labour has
changed.
The state's current urban policy which acknowledges the
inevitability of African urbanisation, but seeks to control it,
has been called 'planned urbanisation". This policy does envisage
the incorporation of some previously excluded sections of the
African urban population into the administrative and financial
ambit of the new metropolitan regions. But its aim is far from
allowing unregulated rural-urban migration and settlement. Rather
it aims to limit the growth of established townships in the core
metropolitan areas and encourage homeless township families as
well as some squatter families to move to new residential areas,
called deconcentration areas, which are being established on the
peripheries of the metropoles. These residential areas are to be
linked to deconcentrated industrial and commercial centres which
are intended to provide employment opportunities for the local
residents.
There are undoubtedly limits to the ability of the
metropolitan centres to generate employment and revenue to cater
( for growing numbers of African workers and their families leaving
the countryside for the squatter settlements on their
peripheries. Thus, invevitably, new forms and mechanisms of
exclusion are being adopted to complement and make possible those
of incorporation of the urban population already discussed.
Central among these mechanisms are the Regional Services
Councils which are being developed as powerful administrative and
fiscal centres. The proposed employment and turnover taxes which
are intended to generate revenue for the Regional Services
Councils are clearly designed to increase the cost and reduce the
incentive to employ African workers in the established
metropolitan centres and encourage their employment in
deconcentration areas and development points• If successful,
these fiscal measures could gradually replace the overtly racist
and repressive direct influx and pass controls presently
exercised by the labour bureaux.
Incorporation of new sections of the urban African
population under the jurisdiction of these councils necessitates
at the same time the exclusion of others. Thus while some
( sections of the urban population will be targeted as
beneficiaries of re-distributive expenditures within the RSCs,
others undoubtedly will be excluded. Thus a crucial unresolved
issue is the formulation of criteria of inclusion and exclusion.
At the minimum, sections of the population resident in the
rural areas within the bantustans will undoubtedly be deemed to
have no claim on the revenues generated and controlled by the
RSCs. If these people are to be prevented from migrating to the
urban areas and thereby increasing urban unemployment, measures
must be designed to control movement within the bantustans
between their urban and rural districts. In soiae areas where the
tribal labour bureaux have collapsed, the Development Boards are
already operating mobile recruitment and registration units which
selectively allocate employment and exclude some rural workers
from urban employment. (12) Recent work done in the south-central
areas of Bophuthatswana has exposed an apparently systematic
attempt to harass non-Tswana people in squatter areas who commute
to employment in the Pretoria or the industrial areas of Brits-
Rosslyn. (13) These examples point to the types of ethnically-
based physical movement and settlement controls that may be
expected from the new dispensation.
The evolving system of movement and settlement controls is
linked to an emerging housing and employment strategy. The
Riekert Commission insisted that the right to move from one urban
area to another should be qualified by availability of approved
housing and employment in the area to which a person wished to
move, and restricted this right to Africans with existing
permanent urban residence rights under Section 10 of the Urban
Areas Act, These principles are being modified to meet the aims
of planned urbanisation. While approved housing and employment
remain necessary qualifications for movement and settlement, the
standard of housing and employment deemed acceptable is being
reduced.
Housing controls within established metropolitan townships
have been relaxed to some degree and provision for some new sites
made, largely for commercial housing construction and sale. Most
expansion is, however, planned in the new deconcentration areas.
Some of these areas, such as Soshanguve near Pretoria, may be
incorporated into the bantustans, while others, such as
Khayelitsha near Cape Town and Soweto-by-the-Sea near Port
Elizabeth, are now likely to remain outside the bantustans.
The employment-linked movement and settlement controls
advocated by the Riekert Commission are similarly to be modified
in order to allow for the accommodation of larger numbers of
Africans in and around the metropolitan areas. The essence of
this strategy is to de-regulate economic activities in the urban
areas and thereby foster the growth of 'informal sector'
employment. This will entail the removal of health and safety
regulations and exemptions from wage determinations in designated
industrial areas.
The concept of 'planned urbanisation' thus seeks to replace
bantustan policy with measures designed to regulate population
movement and settlement within newly defined spatial units which
are centred on the metropolitan areas and embrace neighbouring
bantustans or parts of bantustans deemed to fall within their
labour supply catchment areas. The objective of this policy is to
link such residential areas to industrial deconcentration points
not subject to the stringent wage and health regulations and high
tax structure of the core metropolitan areas and to promote the
growth of employment and income through the fostering of informal
sector activities.
Industrial decentralisation
Industrial decentraliation policy has sought for decades to lend
economic and political credibility to the bantustans, and was as
such predicated on the geographical division between 'white'
South Africa and bantustans. When, in 1975, the physical planning
branches of the state divided South Africa into 44 planning
regions deemed to be geographically and economically
'functional', they were still forced to take as a starting point
the continued centrality of bantustan development and 'homeland'
policy.
In 1981, however, Prime Minister Botha unveiled a regional
development plan premised on a division of South Africa into
eight development regions - the boundaries of which cut across
bantustan boundaries, as part of what the Buthelezi Commission
termed the 'soft-borders' approach. This entailed the planning of
economic development within coherent regions free of the
constraints imposed by political borders. Its corollary was the
creation of the 'multi-lateral' decision-making structure to co-
ordinate development between South Africa and the Transkei-
Bophutatswana-Venda-Ciskei (TBVC) states; the Development Bank of
Southern Africa; and the establishment of Regional Development
Advisory Committees (RDACs) to identify planning priorities
within regions.
The eight regions are more than mere abstractions
superimposed on the map of South Africa. Rather, they correspond
to changes in the geographical patterns of capital location and
labour settlement that have been developing since the late 1960s.
These changes are, in part, the unintended result of previous
decentralisation policies which, more from practical necessity
than philosphical conviction, promoted suburban industrial
development in places such as Hammarsdale, Brits and Rosslyn.
They are also the legacy of the classical apartheid policy of
limiting African urban settlement in 'white' South Africa, and
promoting growth of towns behind bantustan boundaries*
Industrial development in South Africa's metropolitan centres
has been seen as evidence for the validity of spatially dualistic
theories. In the radical literature bantustans are believed to be
the product of a process of underdevelopraent, upon which the
expansion of capitalist centres of industrial activity was based.
Generalisations of this kind take as their starting point the
notion that bantustans occupy a uniform position within a
national division of labour. In reality the bantustans are highly
differentiated entities - if in fact they can be regarded,
economically, as constituting coherent entitles at all. (14)
In our view, the expansion of the metropolitan space-economy
since the late 1960s has entailed two facets: on the one hand an
urbanisation process that has enmeshed and integrated growing
sections of the bantustan populations Into the metropolitan
industrial working classes; and on the other the dispersal to
the metropolitan peripheries (on both sides of the 'borders') of
productive activities (in part through state Inducement) that are
closely tied to the central metropolitan economy through
specialisation, the industrial division of labour and
monopolistic relationships of ownership and control. It is this
fundamental economic dynamic that we call Integrative dispersal.
This concept allows us to grasp the role that bantustans,
metropolitan expansion, urban concentration, and regional
economies play in a new emerging division of industry and labour,
(15)
The new industrial decentralisation policy takes cognisance
of these changes in two ways:
1. It seeks to ensure that the growth of metropolitan regions is
not unnecessarily limited, and attaches considerable importance
to deconcentration points. '... (I)t will largely be necessary to
rely on a process of deconcentration through which the benefits
of agglomeration in the metropolitan areas will be spread over a
wider area without aggravating pressure on the metropoles.'(16)
In encouraging these trends, the state is acknowledging and
attempting to build upon previous patterns of capital-dispersal.
2. It is now encouraging the dispersal of capital to the high-
incentive industrial development points (selected outlying areas
with the potential for further growth) rather than primarily to
remote industrial points in bantustan hinterlands (five to eight
points, according to Grosser). This policy bases itself on the
notion of 'balancing growth poles', which designates certain
towns with proven growth potential as 'growth points'. Their
expansion and development is encouraged in order to draw
investment away from the traditional highly industrialised
metropopitan centres. The designation of certain major towns as
growth points themselves (Bloemfontein, East London, Port
Elizabeth) is intended to facilitate this process.
The new official emphasis on deconcentration is one of
several measures designed to encourage private sector
participation in the regional development programme. Certain
capitals have responded to the upgraded decentralisation
incentives, but sections of organised industry continue to view
the state's decentralisation programme as an artificial attempt
to redistribute resources between regions, rather than allowing
the regions to compete freely against each other. Free inter-
regional competition could, in the view of the FCI, '....lead to
the revitalisation of the South African economy," (17) whereas
induced dispersal is viewed as imposing intolerable costs on
industries based In the metropolitan heartlands, namely, the PWV
area, Durban-Pinetown, Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage and Cape Town.
Industrialists have recently expressed opposition to the Indirect
fiscal controls which the state now intends using to encourage
industrial dispersal and to strengthen the tax base of the
Regional Services Councils, shortly to be installed (FM,
15.03.85).
State planners Intended the new approach to regional
development to provide the basis for the future political and
economic map of South Africa, whether defined in federal or
confederal terms. As the Buthelezi Commission remarked, '...
through its new approach to regional development the government
Is taking the economic route to power sharing rather than the
political one, which is unacceptable to its constituency.' (18)
While the planning bodies associated with the development
regions, like the RDACs, may not themselves evolve into
administrative units, they are seen as a testing ground for 'co-
operative decision-making' and future constitutional
arrangements. Clearly, there is no inevitability that the precise
boundaries drawn up in the 1982 regional develoraent policy will
ultimately become the geographical boundaries of a second tier of
government. What is apparent, however, is that the
bantustans/provinces can no longer constitute the basis of a
second tier of government and therefore new intermediate regional
govrnmental units need to be established.
Constitutional restructuring
Apartheid's racially exclusive democracy was predicated on a
system that reproduced cheap and differentiated labour power.
(19) We have argued that this system has broken down and is
being replaced by the formation of regional proletariats and sub-
economies. The combined effect of this process and the crisis of
political legitimation generated by the mounting national
struggles for non-racial democracy created the conditions for
the ruling classes to re-think the question of African political
representation.
During the course of extensive debates key reformist groups
have begun to perceive the metropolitan and development regions
as providing the most appropriate geographic foundations for the
construction of new local and regional authorities evolving
towards a possible federal system. What follows is an examination
of the institutional forms that the state introducted in 1984-85,
followed by a discussion of the debate over how these structures
can be built into a post-apartheid federal system.
During the last half of 1984 and 1985 the state restructured
the third and second tiers of government to conform with the
procedure laid down in the 1983 President's Council (PC) reports.
This "consociational' structure was originally designed to
underpin the tri-cameral parliamentary system, and hence excluded
Africans. But sustained nation-wide resistance to the
constitution and popular revolts in the townships during 1984
forced the state to incorporate Africans into the RSCs (the upper
level of the third tier of government) in November 1984, and to
restructure those departments which control African affairs at
the first tier level. This abandonment of the PC's
consociational/confederal vision (20) has put federalism on the
agenda for a wide range of reformists.(21) These include English-
speaking liberals, bantustan leaders, influential Afrikaner
verlighte academics, ideologues and politicians, organised
industry and commerce, and the coloured and Indian parliamentary
parties.
The third tier
The third tier is composed of local authorities which deal with
'own affairs' for each racial group, and the Regional Services
Councils (RSCs) which cater for 'general affairs' on a
metropolitan level. (22)
The RSCs will not be elected, but made up of nominated
representatives from all local authorities in a given
metropolitan region, including the black ones. Each local
authority will have one representative for every 10% (or part
thereof) of RSC-provided services that they consume. None will be
allowed more than 50% of the votes on the RSC, and a two-thirds
majority is required for a decision. Thus those authorities which
use the most services (that is, the white ones where industry is
located) will have the greatest say. (23)
The RSCs will become the most powerful bodies involved in the
provision of public goods at the local level. The most important
local authority functions will be transferred to them. Although
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RSCs are based on local authorities as defined by the Group Areas
Act, they are in fact a form of local government that will govern
across group area boundaries. In any case, group areas will
probably be substantially modified once the new Demarcation
Board replaces the old Group Areas Board. The declining
importance of traditional boundaries is evident in the proposed
establishment of 'grey' Central Business Districts (CBDs), in
proposals to place industrial areas under the jurisdiction of
black local authorities (Star, 05.06.85), and to include some
'homeland' areas into the jurisdiction of the RSCs.
RSCs are designed to be self-financing to facilitate the
withdrawal of the central state from the provision of public
goods and services. To this end, a new tax system incorporated
into the RSC Bill is designed to raise Rl,3 billion in the four
main metropolitan areas• There will be two taxes: a regional
establishment levy which is a tax on turnover that may not be
I' added onto prices in the same way as GST; and the regional
services levy which is a tax on wages, salaries, and returns from
profits that may not be deducted from employee's pay packets.
The new tax system elicited a howl of protest from organised
commerce and industry. ASSOCOM, the Federated Chamber of
Industries (FCI); and the SA Property Owners Association
criticised the system as 'totally unworkable' (BD, 09.05.85).
They argued that the new tax will increase the number of
bankrupcies, exacerbate unemployment and fuel inflation, and have
tried to stall the Act in order to allow the Margo Commission on
taxation to review it. (24)
Despite these strong objections, the state is determined to
find a way to resolve the urban crisis and meet the demands of
its moderate African allies. Minister of Cooperation and
Development Gerrit Viljoen admitted in May 1985 that it had been
a mistake to establish black local authorities without providing
them with a viable revenue base (FW, 19-22.05.85). The RSCs,
which were first mooted in certain inner-state circles in 1981,
(25) are designed to overcome this weakness by accomplishing (at
( ' least in theory), three objectives:
1. Substantial redistribution of resources from white to black
areas. Instead of Increasing rent and service charges to finance
urban renewal, oppressed communities will in fact be paying for
it indirectly because the new taxes will Increase consumer
prices.
2. Facilitate the withdrawal of the central state from the
provision of public sevices and deflect national political
demands down to the local level.
3. The tax on turnover and labour costs is intended to encourage
decentralisation of economic activity from the. metropolitan
areas.
The redistributive and legitimising role of the RSCs is
unlikely to succeed in the near future for three reasons:
1. The third tier is in ruins in the African townships. In 1983,
34 Black Local Authorities were introduced and by the end of 1984
there were meant to be 104. By April 1985 there were only three
still functioning (RDM, 16.04.85) as a result of mass resistance.
Although this is unlikely to prevent redistribution, It will
substantially undermine the legitimacy of the RSCs.
11
2. The RSCs are extremely undemocratic, with the balance of power
weighted in favour of big business and the petty bougeoisie
because voting capacity depends on 'user strength'. The
democratic principle of proportional representation is totally
absent, leaving the large impoverished communities politically
powerless.
3. The economic crisis currently facing the state, and the
debates between monetarists and redistributionists, will continue
to constrain supply of public services and hence the management
of capitalist urban reproduction.
The second tier
In May 1985 the state announced that provincial councils would be
scrapped. They will be replaced by strong executive and
administrative committees appointed by the state president.
Contrary to the recommendations of both the majority and minority
reports of the PC in 1983, and the Council for the Coordination
of Local Government Affairs (released in April 1984), the new
second tier authorities will have extensive legislative and
executive powers. They will deal only with 'general affairs'.
These authorities' scope of jurisdiction has not been
explicitly outlined, but there is little doubt that they will be
based on the eight development regions. Already a substantial
planning Infrastructure exists on this level, including the
RDACs, Development Advisory Committees, the Regional Liaison
Committees for those regions that include independent bantustans,
the planning branch of the DCDP, and the Development Boards.
Most provincial council functions will be transferred to the
first and third tiers, and the second tier will in the near
future take charge of local government, regional development,
labour movement controls, and transport.
There has not been an official statement on whether Africans
will be included on the second tier. Minister of Constitutional
Development Chris Heunis did hint, however, that African
interests will be accomodated (Star, 11.05.85), and a top
official in the Department of Constitutional and Development
Planning said that representatives of the non-independent states
will be included. More significantly, the FCI's demand that the
second tier be given substantial powers to coordinate regional
development strategies across bantustan boundaries within a
federal framework has been granted. (26)
The Natal-Kwazulu region is the most advanced as far as the
politics of the second tier In an emerging federal order is
concerned. Reformers of all persuasions, including the NP and the
state have suggested in recent months that the Buthelezi
Commission and the Lombard Report (27) be used as a framework for
consolidating Natal and Kwazulu into a single regional unit
(Star, 07.05.85; 05.05.85; 10,03.85; FM, 03.03.85; RDM, 16.04.85;
BD, 21.05.85), In May the cabinet considered a plan to implement
this. It would involve consolidating Kwazulu into an area
stretching from KwaMashu outside Durban to the Mozambique border
which would contain 'white' towns like Empangeni, Eshowe and
Richards Bay. Natal would then stretch from the north of Durban,
and include the south coast and East Griqualand. In keeping with
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the Buthelezi Commission, the two parts would be governed by a
central federal authority. In June the first step was taken when
the NRP and NP representatives in the Natal Provincial Council
began to formulate a framework for establishing a statutory body
to deal with 'general affairs' for Natal-Kwazulu as a whole
(Star, 06.06.85).
The Buthelezi Commission called for a federal legislative
authority for all races in Natal-Kwazulu to be elected on a one-
man-one-vote basis with proportional representation. The multi-
racial executive should be co-chaired by the provincial
administrator and Kwazulu Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi. Other
recommendations were: a minority veto for 10% of legislature;
that legislation should be tested by the courts; a Bill of
Rights; and minimum group representation. Although these
proposals were rejected by Finance Minister Owen Horwood in 1982,
in May Cooperation and Development Minister Viljoen announced in
parliament that the Buthelezi Commission was in line with
President PW Botha's policy that the only alternative to the
complicated task of further consolidating Kwazulu was to
recognise that Natal and Kwazulu are economically and hence
politically inter-dependent (Star, 06.06.85). This announcement
was followed by a meeting between PW Botha and Buthelezi which
the press interpreted as another step towards the implementation
of a regional federal solution for Natal-Kwazulu (j>T, 19.05.85).
Although the new second tier system centralises power in the
hands of the DCDP, this is designed to facilitate the transition
to multi-racial regional authorities that cut across bantustan
boundaries in the long run. The politicised nature of the old
provincial councils (with the Transvaal moving increasingly to
the right), would have prevented a technocratic top-down
transition to multi-racial regional authorities in the manner
envisaged by the Buthelezi Commission and Lombard Report• The
fact that they have extensive powers suggests that the regions
will be able to develop according to regionally specific
economic, political and ideological conditions and the way in
which these are used by local economic and political elites.
The first tier
There is a new consensus that 'no real progress in stabilising
and normalising relations between people within South Africa or
between South Africa and other countries can be made unless legal
racial discrimination is removed in the political institutions of
this country. The future 'legitimacy of the Republic of South
Africa both internally and externally depends on this issue',
(28) Stoffel van der Merwe, National Party MP and ideologue,
wrote in the NP pamphlet entitled '...And what about the Black
People?' that was approved by PW Botha: 'Now, in 1985, we have
reached a stage where it (the national convention) can be
postponed no longer.'(29)
The state has not yet presented a coherent outline of what a
future first tier will look like. Instead, the special cabinet
committee formed in February 1983 to investigate the 'urban black
problem' established a multi-party negotiating forum in January
1985. This was to discuss with 'black leaders' ways to include
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Africans in higher levels of decision making. Commonly referred
to as a 'mini-national convention', the forum generated a spate
of declarations of intent, as various ruling group interests
tried to force the state to give the forum a clear federalist
agenda. However, much to Buthelezi's chagrin, the state has
refused to issue a declaration of intent, on the grounds that
negotiations should remain open-ended. Instead, the state has
introduced a range of reforms used by officials to demonstrate
the state's good intentions. These include the repeal of the sex
laws, the removal of the ban on multi-racial political parties,
the announced moratorium on removals, easing of inlux control,
moves to de-racialise CBDs, and promises to incorporate blacks
into higher forms of decision making.
Stoffel Van Der Merwe's NP pamphlet maps out a corporate
federal structure for the central state that would involve
establishing a Black Assembly to deal with African 'own affairs'
for 'non-homeland' Africans. This would then link up to a supra-
parliamentary coordinating organ made up of representatives from
the Black Assembly, the tri-cameral parliament, and independent
bantustan states. In this way the dual 'own affairs'- 'general
affairs' structure would be replicated on all three tiers,
leaving the NP's white power base intact - a model that PW Botha
calls 'cooperative co-existence'. This has been interpreted by
some observers as the first step towards a geographic federation
(SStar, 19.05.85).
The regional or geographic federal alternative proposed by
the PFP, the Labour Party, Inkatha and big business is critical
of the racial federal model because it concentrates power in the
central state. They call for the transfer of substantial power to
democratically-elected regional and local federal authorities,
with Kwazulu/Natal as the first laboratory for a future
geographic federation. This implies that the future form of the
central state should be designed only after the lower tiers have
been established.
In the meantime, powerful reformers in the state have
substantially modified key central state institutions. The recent
cabinet reshuffle saw a significant shift of institutional power.
The state under 'grand apartheid' controlled every aspect of
African life in 'white' South Africa through a separate
department (Native Affairs through to the present Department of
Cooperation and Development - DCD) and by way of the 'homeland'
states in 'black' South Africa.
The DCD is now virtually defunct. The following functions
have been transferred to other departments over the last year:
African education to the Department of Education and Training,
labour bureaux to the Department of Manpower, commissioners'
courts to the Department of Justice, relations with 'homelands'
to the Department of Foreign Affairs. In the cabinet reshuffle,
responsibility for black local government and the Development
Boards was transferred to the DCDP. This leaves the DCD in charge
of trust land and development aid for the 'non-independent'
bantustans. The DCDP now controls the following: all local
authorities and RSCs through the multi-racial Council for the
Coordination of Local Government Affairs (CCLGA); the second tier
which includes the new regional committees, RDACs, Regional
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Liaison Committees, and significantly the Development Boards;
(30) liaison with the bantustans through the multi-lateral
coordinating bodies; 'homeland' consolidation; and Group Areas.
This Bonapartist concentration of power in the DCDP clears
the way for a process of reconstruction that may have far-
reaching implications for the federalist momentum. The fact that
it works closely with capital in the RDACs, with the bantustans
in the multi-lateral structures, and with moderate urban Africans
in the CGLGA and Development Boards, means that it will be
directly exposed to the combined demand of these interests for a
more coherent geographic federation to ease South Africa out of
the present interregnum.
The federalism debate
V After 1979, reformers inside the state began to recognise that
the Verwoerdian vision of parcelling South Africa up into
independent ethnic states was unrealisable.(31) Those
institutional pillars of apartheid, the bantustans, could not
achieve either economic autonomy or political legitimacy. Their
re-integration into a common economic planning and political
framework was increasingly seen as inevitable, notwithstanding
the granting of 'independence' to Venda in 1979 and Ciskei in
1981.
The concept of federalism has a long history in the English-
speaking reformist community.(32) The Progressive Party advocated
a federal formula as far back as 1962, following the
recommendations of its internal Molteno Commission. The United
Party adopted a federal programme in 1972, and its successor, the
New Republic Party, has advocated a 'federal-confederal' option
for South Africa.(33) Both parties view African urbanisation as
inevitable, and accept the corrollary that sections of the
African population must eventually somehow be politically
accommodated within central state political institutions.
(.; Set up by the Kwazulu legislative assembly, the 1982
Buthelezi Commission report recieved strong support from English-
speaking liberals in Natal. It argued for a single
geographically-based federal administration for Natal and
Kwazulu. (34) The report hinted that a national federal system,
in which Natal and Kwazulu together made up one of a number of
regional units, provided a long-term solution to South Africa's
problem of national political representation. (35)
Before the 1985 parliamentary session, the government was
publicly committed to establishing a confederal system which
required bantustan leaders to accept independence and then enter
into an 'international' agreement linking them to South Africa,
Some bantustan leaders - for example Sebe of the Ciskei and
Mphephu of Venda - supported the government's ethnic confederal
blueprint, and resisted the idea of geographical federation in
which bantustans would lose their 'independence'. (36)
Other bantustans refused independence (Kwazulu, Lebowa,
Kangwane, Gazankulu and Qwa Qwa), and two 'independent'
bantustans (Transkei and Bophuthatswana) openly rejected
Pretoria's schemes for confederation. In July 1983, the leaders
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of these bantustans, excluding Bophuthatswana, issued a
declaration of intent in which they stated that, in the event of
their opting for a constitutional arrangement, they would
structure it on a regional, non-racial and non-ethnic basis.(37)
There is considerable ferment among Afrikaner verligte
reformers, both within and outside the National Party (FM,
23.11.84; 14.06.85). The NP pamphlet entitled '...and what about
the Black People?' acknowledges that grand apartheid has met with
insuperable problems, and enumerates several new possibilities:
The national states might obtain powers over some of the
areas outside their borders; local authorities might be given
considerably wider powers; local authorities might be linked
together in authoritative structures encompassing larger
areas; new bodies comparable to the white provincial councils
might be established; a national assembly of black people
outside the national states might be brought into being; some
of these bodies might be involved in decision-making at the
highest level in conjunction with the South African
parliament and the governents of the national and possibly
even the independent states. (38)
Two key features are present here: a search for means of
incorporating Africans within central state institutions, and
retention of race or ethnic identity as the basis for political
representation. This may lead to what has been termed corporate
federalism (or federal/confederalism), where membership of a
racial or ethnic group, rather than territorial location, defines
the composition of the federating units.
Another model has been proposed in reports sponsored by
organised industry and commerce (notably ASSOCOM and the Sugar
Association). (39) They call for a federation based on
geographically rather than racially or ethnically defined units.
ASSOCOM's report rejects corporate federalism on the grounds
that it will be seen to be racist and calls instead for a
geographic federation which can protect minority group rights
while simultaneously creating a single national state.
Federalism is seen by the ruling groups as a resolution to
the problem of incorporating Africans politically, while
retaining and strengthening a capitalist system. Both conceptions
of federalism, corporate and geographic, have in common two basic
features:
1) the view that 'economic freedom and the private enterprise
ethic - as well as the norms with which they are associated - are
best entrenched in a future political system embodying the
principles of federalism or confederalism'; (40)
2) the belief that federalism is preferable to both apartheid and
a majoritarian unitary state, because it allows for creation of a
new nation-state which grants political rights to all its
subjects while 'protecting minorities'.
In fact, concern for group rights masks more fundamental
fears: firstly, that a state dominated by a black majority could
begin building socialism, or at least impose a welfare state
system that entails 'confiscatory taxation', (41) fiscal
indiscipline, high minimum wages and nationalisation. (The latter
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is certainly implied in the Freedom Charter.) Secondly, the too-
rapid advancement of an inexperienced black elite into senior
positions in the civil service, government and business could
lead to managerial inefficiency and administrative 'chaos'. (42)
The third fear, rather than that whites would be attacked, is
that ethnic conflicts under majority rule could lead to economic
and political breakdown.
Proponents of federalism argue that the only way to prevent
a black majoritarian state imposing socialism or a welfare state
from above is to establish relatively autonomous local and
regional political entities- These would hold sovereign power
over limited coercive apparatuses and economic policies,
fragmenting a national majority regionally.
Federalism also lends itself to a system of institutional
checks and balances both regionally and within the central state.
These include structures like an independent federal reserve
bank, separate legislative houses, a separate legislature,
executive and judiciary. Further, entrenched constitutional
provisions could protect freedom of contract, the status of the
currency, minority veto rights, the right to property, and so on.
A federal system would thus limit any one group's access to
political power.
A central government operating according to these principles
might for example have co:
* accept unpopular monetary measures imposed by the (ostensibly
apolitical) federal reserve bank; or
* secure acceptance of legislation from two legislative houses;
or
* accept limits on its power to impose its policies on particular
regions; or
* allow the constitutionality of its policies to be tested by an
independent judiciary.
This is what Lombard and du Pisanie call 'polycentrisra'.
Such 'division of sovereignty' (43) is a prescription for minimal
or limited government, which leaves the state incapable of
affecting radical changes. Reformers in the ruling groups hope a
federal system would place the central state above political
conflict, making it difficult to mobilise nation-wide forces
around demands with national scope. A federal state would by
default leave intact the foundations of the economy and relations
of production, and expose only marginal or localised elements of
the economic system to modification.
The meaning of 'group rights' and the theory of ethnic
pluralism thus becomes apparent. The apartheid legacy of
'ethnicity' is now being used by many reformers as a rationale
for a federal system which could provide the basis for a
reconstituted capitalist political economy. Ethnicity need not
necessarily be legally entrenched, because apartheid has ensured
that racial and ethnic groups are already geographically
separate.
The call for some kind of federal solution is rapidly
becoming the cornerstone of consensus among those favouring a
reformist solution in South Africa.
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A critical analysis of regional federalism
This paper has not attempted to provide a holistic analysis of
the current period of crisis and restructuring in South Africa.
Such an analysis would have required an examination of a number
of developments that we have left out of our account, or have
only superficially touched upon: the economic stagnation of the
1970s and 1980s; the current recession; the resurgence of various
froms of oppositional politics; the 1984-85 township rebellion
culminating in the state of emergency; and numerous other
factors that have combined to make the present conjuncture
extremely fluid and unpredictable.
We argued that a consensus has emerged within the reformist
elite about the need to implement changes that go well beyond the
'Total Strategy' initiatives of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In part this further metamorphosis of the reform process is the
outcome of Increasingly intense conflict between the regime and
its opponents - in particular its failure to establish legitimacy
for the new black local authorities and the tri-cameral
parliament and, more recently, its inability to curb the wave of
popular demonstrations, boycotts, strikes and other civil
disturbances that began early in 1984.
It was these events which forced the government to include
Africans in the RSCs, to re-examine the question of African
political participation in the central state, and to consider
substantial modifications to its influx control policies.
However we also argue that the necessity for, and direction
being taken by state restructuring in these areas can only be
fully understood if it is related to changes in South Africa's
spatial reproductive economy. By this we mean the development of
new patterns of capital and labour location, in particular the
dispersal of capital from metropolitan heartlands to metropolitan
peripheries and to other regions; the enmeshing of certain
bantustan labour supply areas into the process of metropolitan
urbanisation; and the crystallisation of regional economies and
regional proletariats. These processes, which have drained of
meaning the conventional dichotomies of bantustan/white South
Africa and urban/rural, have informed thinking about the RSC
concept as well as debates around second tier regional structures
in a future federation. They have also directly shaped the
regional development strategies. Finally, they have influenced
aspects of the emerging policy of 'planned urbanisation'.
We have showed, briefly, how the devolution of power, the
partial 'de-racialisation' of administration and the proposed
federalist system are being developed as an alternative to
'majoritarianism' and all that the ruling groups fear would
accompany majority rule: bureaucratic breakdown, social
disruption, inter-communal conflict, welfare statism, socialism.
The more immediate purpose of these initiatives is to help
the state re-impose 'law and order', secure a degree of popular
quiescence and regain control of the pace and direction of
political developments. The 'reforms' are conciously designed to
arrest, rather than promote, rapid and fundamental change. They
are, we believe, therefore unlikely to satisfy crucial popular
demands.
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The reform initiatives are unlikely to meet popular demands
for rational economic planning to reduce unemployment and
inflation or for improved provision of basic services. The
restructuring process involves a curious combination of 'free
market' and 're-distributive' policies. On the one hand, the
central state, confronted by a fiscal crisis and committed to a
monetarist economic program, is cutting back its role in the
provision of welfare services (as for example in the case of
bread and transport subsidies). At the same time, the state is
confronted by a political crisis in the urban areas, and
recognises that it has to improve the quality of life of black
townships in order to restore stability there. Its solution is to
force the RSCs to subsidise expenditures in the townships
through its payroll and turnover levies.
The logic seems to be threefold. First of all, such a
programme (theoretically) allows the central state to insulate
itself from competition over the allocation of resources, thereby
localising these conflicts. Secondly, devolution of fiscal
responsibility forces capitalists to choose between subsidising
metropolitan services or relocating their investments to
decentralisation growth points. In other words, businessmen
cannot have it both ways: if they insist upon the desirability of
urbanisation they must be willing to pay for it.
And finally, since the total resources available for
redistribution remains limited, especially in a period of
economic stagnation, it is impossible for the state to satisfy
every locality's claims on social resources. Given that this is
so, it makes sense for the central state to allow local and
metropolitan governments to rely on their own fiscal resources,
however unequal these may be. The likely result is increased
inequality between metropolitan regions. To offset this (and its
potentially explosive political consequences in areas like the
Eastern Cape) the state is relying on persuading capitals to
relocate to less developed regions in response to incentives
offered there. These incentives form part of a decentralisation
program that is itself expensive, at least in the short to medium
term.
Whether these various objectives - central state withdrawal,
metropolitan upliftment and regional development - can be
accomplished simultaneously, especially in a period of low
economic growth, remains highly doubtful. Consider the dilemma
facing the metropolitan authorities. Since the RSCs would enjoy a
minimum of financial support from the central state, the only way
they could hope to deliver adequate services to the black urban
areas would be by raising metropolitan taxes and levies beyond
the levels presently envisaged. If they raise taxes beyond a
certain point, they could provoke either a capital flight to
regions offering better incentives or else an investment slowdown
that would further reduce economic growth in the economy as a
whole.
If they chose to spend beyond their means the RSCs could
generate a series of local fiscal crises, forcing the central
state to bail out troubled councils in an ad hoc way. The state's
overall borrowing requirements would have to expand (whether it
is the central state or the metropolitan authority that does the
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rborrowing), and this in turn could swell the national debt,
create inflationary difficulties or force interest rates to rise.
The alternative would be to cut back on the provision of
services.
If the RSCs cannot provide goods on a scale that meets the
Increasingly insistent demands of poor and working people in the
urban areas, they could be forced into a game of 'divide and
rule', playing some recipients of social goods off against
others. With considerably more goods available for distribution
in black townships than in the past, metropolitan authorities
could, in some cases, play such a game quite effectively,
providing them - and the central state - with new resources of
social control.
Faced by increasingly sophisticated techniques of co-option,
popular organisations will have to rethink their own tactical and
strategic responses. Under these circumstances it will be more
important than ever to reiterate the demand for democratically-
determined social welfare priorities, and for services that
address the needs of the poorest regions and social strata within
regions. These demands will have to backed up by an increasingly
articulate call for strategies to promote economic recovery in
ways that are not detrimental to the interests of the working
class.
The reforms cannot satisfy popular demands for democratic
participation in the reform process. Political restructuring is
proceeding in a top-down, managerial way, with at best a small
circle of influential reformers and black collaborators being
drawn into decision making. The public language of ruling group
reformers is framed in the Imagery of the free market economy,
technocratic neutrality, local democracy, consensus and
consultation. Its private agenda - where such an agenda exists -
is shrouded in deliberate secrecy. Public deception Is central to
the timing and delivery of reforms; it is seen as crucial to
defusing opposition from both the right and the left. If it
should fail to effectively contain popular opposition, the state
is more ready than ever to resort to repression. It seeks reform,
but as a precondition for that it demands tight control.
Reformers are concerned to maintain constant vigilance
against all political initiatives not amenable to state
manipulation. They are determined to force others to conform to
their own plans. This requires that they negotiate only from a
'position of strength' - which means ensuring the weakness of
community organisations, trade unions and political groupings
seeking fundamental change through grass roots struggle.
Deception and repression are thus the constant companions of
'reform',
Reformers In the state cannot satisfy popular demands for
democratic political representation. While accompanied by talk
about the 'devolution' of power, the reorganisation of the state
system involves a combination of centralising and decentralising
tendencies. Crucial functions - for example, security, the
formulation of the reform program, foreign policy - are being
concentrated In executive organs insulated from electoral
pressures and public scrutiny. These organs include the office of
the president, top officials in a few key departments (like
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Constitutional Development and Planning), and the State Security
Council. These are the commanding heights of the authoritarian-
reformist state that the Botha leadership has set in place.
At the same time, second and third tier structures will be
given genuine powers, but mainly (it seems at this stage) of an
administrative kind. For example, while the RSCs are likely to
command considerable resources, their sole function will be the
management of certain kinds of 'hard' services at the
metropolitan level. At the same time an attempt is deliberately
being made to remove the RSCs from the field of political
contestestation, to present them instead in a neutral, technical
visage. They will also be predicated on indirect, rather than
direct, representation and on the over-representation of
wealthier municipalities. Devolution of power along these lines
does not involve real democratisation.
A final - and directly related - demand that the 'reforms'
cannot satisfy is the demand for national democratic rights - for
the effective transfer of sovereignity to the representatives of
the majority of South Africans. The emerging federal framework is
intended to prevent national democratic forces from mobilising
against the central state and, should they come to control that
state, it is designed to prevent them from effectively using it
to bring about radical social and economic changes.
The ideological rationale for anti-majoritarian federalism
lies in the argument that minority rights need to be protected
from 'majority domination'. And, indeed, one can readily concede
that minorities should have 'rights' - rights to freedom of
speech, press, association, religion, petition, to practice their
own culture, to equal political rights, to safeguard their
material well-being. But minorities do not have the 'right' to
entrench their political and economic privileges at the expense
of the majority.
In South Africa the right of the majority to rule - whatever
form that rule may take - remains non-negotiable. This is the
basic right demanded in the Freedom Charter and other popular
manifestos, and is implicit in the programme of the workers'
movement.
Conclusion
The fate of the 'reform' process is extremely uncertain. Whether
or not it gains any substance will depend on the outcome of
struggles within the ruling party and in reformist circles; it
will also depend on struggles between reformists and their
opponents both on the right and in the popular movements;
finally, it will depend on the state of the economy. Yet it would
be wrong to dismiss the restructuring process as simply cosmetic.
It could prove real enough to reshape, in important ways
 f the
terrain upon which struggles over fundamental change are being
played out.
The 'reforms' could have a considerable impact on, for
example, the amount of resources available for the co-option of
sections of the black population. They could also affect the
international saleability of South Africa's constitutional order.
21
These are but two of the many areas in which they could have an
impact.
How far the restructuring process 'succeeds' will depend on
how seriously it is taken by its opponents. To dismiss the
'reforms' in advance as illusory or unworkable, or to suppress
discussion of their content and direction, would automatically
enhance their effectiveness as weapons in the hands of the ruling
groups.
The claim that the 'reforms' are cosmetic is likely to carry
less analytical and moral force as time goes by. A much more
powerful criticism would be one that exposes the real motives
behind the 'reforms', decodes the discourses and shows,
concretely, why - and where - they are unlikely to satisfy key
popular demands* We have already commenced, but by no means
completed, this task.
We should not however assume that the entire 'reform' process
is so pervaded with repression and authoritarianism, or that it
so uniformly expresses the will of the ruling class and the
imperatives of class domination, or that it is so immutable, that
some of its elemants are not open to transformation into
something more democratic and into something capable of advancing
certain popular objectives.
The 'reforms' are complex and varied; some offer more spaces
and opportunities that others. We need to seriously examine these
spaces and opprtunities, both to assess their importance to short
and medium terra strategy, and in order to determine what
elements, if any, can be built upon in the struggle for a
radically different order. (44)
If we accept that the process of building democratic
structures must begin in the here and now, and that certain
progressive reforms are possible prior to the achievement of full
democratic rights, then we must ask whether, and to what extent,
the reform process is generating resources and openings that can
be utilised as a part of a 'politics of transformation'.(45) Can
some of the emerging structures be utilised by organisations
seeking to institutionalise genuinely democratic practices? Can
they be used to secure material concessions that in turn could
help to bolster the credibility, and power, of those
organisations?
It may be wrong to adopt a principled but purely rejectionist
response, in advance, to everything that the restructuring
process delivers; what is needed instead is the capacity to
butress rejection with rigorous critical analysis, and to modify
rejection, where necessary, with a careful assessment of new
strategic opportunities.
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